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Abstract: Most methodological discussion in experimental economics has been 
pursued by justifying the use of experiments as theory testing vehicles. More recently 
it has also been argued that the external validity of experiments requires the use of 
non- experimental field evidence. Therefore, it is argued, experiments are 
intermediaries between theories and field evidence. In this paper it is proposed that 
this picture of experiments is mistaken in the general case and that experiments can be 
justifiably undertaken as autonomous vehicles of discovery independently of theory- 
testing or field evidence. 
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   Experimentation is now an accepted method of research within economics and, as a 
result there have been an increasing number of papers which have examined it from a 
methodological point of view. Typical examples of this phenomenon can be found in 
the Economic Journal symposium (1999) and the symposium in the Journal of 
Economic Methodology (2005). In the past few years methodological research has 
gone from a fairly rigid defence of experimentation while experiments were a novel 
technique in economics (See Smith 1982), to a more questioning attitude which 
attempts to show the strengths and weaknesses of the experimental technique. 
 The main thesis of this paper is that experiments are autonomous research 
activities which contribute in their own right to economic knowledge. This means that 
they can be wholly independent of theory testing and do not necessarily need to be 
externally validated by field studies (as argued by Guala 2003). This proposition is 
not novel- Sugden (2005) for example argues that experiments which investigate 
phenomena (known as “exhibits”) are as valid as theory- testing experiments.  
 However, while it is accepted that such experiments are possible there has 
been little real analysis of why these “exhibits” are valid or in what way they are 
methodologically useful. It is often the case that acknowledgement of their existence 
is followed by them being ignored, while the methodological analysis concentrates on 
aspects of theory testing (examples of this are Starmer 1999, Cubitt 2005 and Guala 
2005). It is the aim of this paper to demonstrate that a certain group of experiments 
cannot be externally validated using field studies, while  still being externally valid 
and do not rely on a theory testing methodology, while remaining  very useful. In 
doing this I will draw on literature from the new philosophy of experimentation (c.f. 
Radder 2003, Hacking 1984, Franklin1986). In the conclusion I will then argue that 
this analysis can be applied to experiments in general. 
 
 
CAUSAL CONTROL EXPERIMENTS 
 
 In order to proceed with the analysis it will be necessary to define the class of 
experiments which will be used in the subsequent analysis. This class of experiment 
will intentionally be an extreme type which will help to clarify the argument in 
subsequent sections. Then, at the end of the paper, the arguments made will be 
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transferred to experiments in general. First of all we will divide experiments in 
economics into two types. The first type of experiment is that which includes all tests 
of theories. An example of this would be various tests of expected utility and the 
further tests of the successor descriptive theories (see Starmer 2000 for an overview). 
This is the conventional role of a theory- testing relationship which is analysed in 
Guala (2005). The second type of experiment is that which produces an “exhibit” 
(Sugden 2005). An exhibit is a phenomenon produced by an experiment which is 
constructed to produce it rather than to test a theory. An example of this is the long 
run of experiments which were used to prove and isolate the preference reversal 
phenomenon (see Guala 2000 for an overview). As Starmer (1999) points out, 
whether an experiment is an exhibit or whether it is theory testing is quite often a 
matter of circumstance. A test of a theory may turn up an anomalous phenomenon 
which is then isolated as an exhibit. On the other hand theories may be formulated and 
tested which are based on exhibits (Sugden 2005). 
 Following Guala (2005) and Siakantaris (2000) we will say that the primary 
aim of experimentation is to uncover causal relationships in the external world. In 
other words, we aim for explanation by finding out what causes are responsible for an 
effect. In the case of an economics experiment, the causes are usually found in the 
beliefs and desires of the agents taking part in the experiment or in the institutions set 
up within the experiment. In the former case, since in experiments we only currently 
have access to people’s behaviour, we infer the causal beliefs and desires from their 
behaviour. 
 Following Harre (2003) we will say that these exhibit producing experiments can be 
further divided into two types. The first type is the “domesticated system” type of 
experiment. In this case the experimenter tries to model the outside world in the 
experiment, using her understanding of how the system being studied works and the 
relevant causes. This “domestication” works by mimicking the system as it occurs in 
nature, while controlling inessential factors, and then running it using human subjects. 
The aim is to create a simplified version of the external world in the laboratory. 
 An example of this would be experimental markets where different market 
set- ups have been found to have drastic effects on behaviour (See Kagel & Roth ch.5 
1995 for an overview). While the institutions created in such an experiment are all 
backed by economic theory, there have been experiments which have been set up to 
investigate effects rather than to test this theory. Examples of this include those 
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experiments set up to examine effects created by specific institutions existing in the 
external world such as posted price or uniform price auctions. Insofar as these markets 
replicate (as far as economists know) the workings of the market, while excluding the 
irrelevant elements which usually exist in real- world markets, then they can be called 
domesticated. Since, quite often, the effect being sought is not predicted by any 
theory, it should be described as an “exhibit”. 
 The second type of exhibit producing experiment is what will be described 
here as a Causal Control Experiment1 (or CCE for short). CCEs do not aim to mimic 
economic systems but, instead, to find the cause(s) for a particular effect within the 
system. This is done by intervening in the workings of particular mechanisms within 
that system by using controls. These controls hold possible confounding factors 
constant while only allowing the perceived cause to be uncontrolled. The control on 
the perceived cause can then be varied to find out whether there is a corresponding 
effect as a result of the variation. 
  It can be seen that CCEs need not be realistic in the sense of representing any 
part of the economy in the same way that domesticated experiments do. The aim is 
purely to find causal relationships rather than to represent even a simplified model of 
the world. Given that an effect, such as preference reversal, may have multiple causes; 
it follows that isolating each individual cause will result in experiments where most 
causes of a phenomenon are effectively held constant. This would be highly 
unrealistic because in the external world all of the causes would be operating at once. 
However, in spite of this lack of realism these experiments are useful because they 
give an explanation for why effects happen.  
 An example of this type of experiment can be found in some of the research 
done into choice under uncertainty. Some of the phenomena found by 
experimentalists such as event- splitting effects, violations of monotonicity and 
intransitivities (see Starmer 2000) are experimental effects which have no real link to 
any theory and stand on their own as exhibits within experimental research. It is true 
that some of these experiments were done in the framework of a given theory and can 
be interpreted as contradicting various theories. However, they were often replicated 
in other experiments whose sole purpose was to follow up on the initial discoveries. 
Furthermore the experiments involve very tight, unrealistic controls on the types of 
                                                 
1 Harre (2003) describes this as a “Bohrian” experiment but this label has little meaning in an 
economics context. 
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decision which can be made by subjects. They cannot be seen as representative of real 
decisions made in the external world. As such they can be seen as CCEs. 
 
 
AUTONOMY FROM THEORY- TESTING 
 
 Having defined CCE’s as a separate class of experiment it can be seen that 
they are also defined to be independent of theory. However, is this supposed 
independence genuine and, if so, is it valid? The latter is obviously believed to be so 
by Sugden (2005) but apart from his paper, none other has seriously analysed the idea 
of non theory- testing experiments. Starmer’s (1999) defence of experimentation is 
presented purely in terms of theory testing. To take an example, when answering 
worries about how to tell whether Smith’s (1982) precepts of experimentation are 
satisfied, his answer is essentially based around the idea of theory testing. He states 
that the theory being tested is always in a joint test with the auxiliary assumptions 
(such as Smith’s precepts) and so one is faced with the Duhem- Quine problem2 of 
how to deal with an anomalous result. Guala’s (2005) comprehensive study of 
experimental methodology approaches the relationship between theory and 
experiment from essentially the same angle. Many of his chapters focus on traditional 
philosophy of science problems such as Bayesian updating and the Hypothetico- 
Deductive model, all of which assume the primacy of theory testing. 
 Ironically, therefore, there seems to be very little interest in the philosophy of 
experiments as opposed to the philosophy of theory testing as applied to economic 
experiments. This is quite unlike a movement which has developed to create just such 
a set of ideas within the philosophy of natural science (see Hacking 1983, Radder 
2003, Franklin 19863). This philosophy developed in reaction to a perceived excessive 
focus of philosophy of science on theorising and the testing of theories. It also moved 
away from the purely logical approach often previously used to focus on how 
experiments were actually carried out.  This  philosophy concentrates on the 
instruments used in the experimental laboratory and also how these instruments both 
enhance and constrain the knowledge which can be obtained from experiments. It 
                                                 
2 This is the idea that any individual test of a theory is always to some extent a joint test of the theory 
and the network of theories in the background which support the original theory’s presuppositions. 
3 It is true that the authors mentioned have been referenced by Guala (2000) and Morgan (2005) 
however, they have not drawn out the implications for this point of view. 
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should be emphasised that these “instruments” do not have to be solid pieces of 
apparatus such as dice or computers but could be any device used for eliciting or 
controlling behaviour. 
  Instrumentation within economic experiments varies from experiment to experiment 
and within individual experiments. Examples include the computers that are used to 
carry out many interactive experiments as well as the software that is run on them. 
These are enabling pieces of apparatus that allow the construction of the “institutions” 
in the experiment and so elicit behaviour from the subjects. An example of these is 
displays of game matrices on the screens of computerised experiments. There are also 
the rules of the experiment that allow for control of behaviour. An example of the 
“controlling” function of experimental apparatus includes the common custom in 
game theory experiments of keeping subjects isolated and anonymous. The final 
function of experimental apparatus is to measure outputs from the experiment. 
Examples of this are the binary lottery mechanism as well as the Becker- de Groot- 
Marschak elicitation device (Becker et al. 1963). 
 The point of instruments within an experiment is to elicit phenomena 
(Hacking 1983). One uses instruments to control causes and to create an effect. This 
effect is not necessarily one which would ever exist in the outside world so there is 
the question of whether one can tell if a phenomenon is real or is simply an artefact of 
the experiment (Woodward 2003). Part of the answer to this is to eliminate 
experimental artefacts before the experiment in a process of calibration (see Franklin 
1986, also Guala 2005). However, as Hacking states, the reality of the phenomena is 
ultimately assured when it can be manipulated. 
 Manipulation is a very important process in establishing the reality of a 
phenomenon. The example Hacking gives is that of a microscope where one can tell, 
for example, if one is injecting a fluid into a particular part of a cell because one can 
see the microneedle being pushed into the cell through the microscope. The act of 
pushing the needle through the cell wall correlates with one seeing the injection of the 
cell. This establishes that the absorption of fluid by the cell is a real thing and not an 
artefact because one’s manipulation corresponds with one’s observation in the 
experiment. At a more fundamental level, if one thinks that an instrument such as a 
particular (light) microscope is suspected of producing artefacts then one can apply an 
electron microscope to the same phenomenon. If the two (quite distinct) types of 
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microscope show the same effect then it is likely that the phenomenon is not an 
artefact and increases the likelihood of it being real.  
 A similar idea of manipulation can be applied within economic experiments. 
However, in contrast to the experiments described by Hacking (1983), economic 
phenomena tend to be much more difficult to manipulate than a simple microscopic 
observation session. Each manipulation may take one experiment to do, or at least one 
control group per experiment. For this reason an economic phenomenon may take 
longer to establish as being real. An example of this is in ultimatum game 
experiments where a variety of manipulations (Camerer 2003) have been tried to 
establish the reality of the phenomenon of equitable division between proposers and 
responders. 
  At the more fundamental level of testing instruments, there are examples of 
such testing although this type of activity is comparatively rare. The most complete 
example of this type of instrument- testing has taken place with the testing of the 
preference- reversal phenomenon (see Guala 2000 for a review). Part of the problem 
with some of the original experiments in preference reversal (e.g. by Grether and Plott 
1979)4 was that they solely used the Becker- de Groot- Marschak (BDM) mechanism 
(an elicitation instrument) to measure the prices subjects were willing to accept for a 
lottery. However, the BDM mechanism depends on the subject being an expected 
utility maximiser. When the subjects were found to suffer from preference reversals 
then this assumption was violated.  Karni and Safra (1987) picked up this problem 
when they demonstrated that the preference reversal phenomenon could occur if one 
assumed that the subject did not obey the independence axiom and one used the BDM 
mechanism to elicit preferences. This meant that the preference reversal was not a 
fundamental problem but simply an artefact of a far less fundamental problem 
(violation of independence) and an artefact of an instrument (the BDM mechanism).  
Tversky et al. (1990) demonstrated that this effect did not occur and that preference 
reversal existed independently of the BDM instrument. 
    If one is trying to find the causes of a particular phenomenon then using CCEs is, 
by definition, the best way to discover them as one can control the experiment without 
having to replicate a mechanism in the external world. However, it must be asked, 
                                                 
4 Although, ironically not by some of the very first experiments carried out by Lichtenstein and Slovic 
(1973) 
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what is the relationship between theory- testing and this type of exhibit? Just how free 
of theory-testing is it possible for an experiment to be? 
It could be said that if, for example, one was testing for the effect of gender on 
behaviour in the ultimatum game (as in Eckel and Grossman 2001) then one could say 
that one was testing a hypothesis.  This could be interpreted as a test of a hypothesis 
along the lines of “In all Ultimatum games, men offer less money than women”. In 
fact, in Eckel and Grossman’s paper this is roughly at the level of generality that the 
hypothesis was actually stated. It is this type of hypothesis that Guala (2005) calls a 
“low-level” hypothesis that can be fitted into a theory- testing framework.  
As it stands there does not seem to be any need to distinguish between CCEs 
and other theory testing experiments. However it is plausible that many experiments 
don’t even start with this type of hypothesis but instead start as a “hunch” about how 
people will behave in an experimental environment. In that case a statement of a 
“hunch” would be something like: “In this particular ultimatum game environment, 
with subjects divided into males and females, men will offer less money than 
women”. This is not to say that all CCEs need to have statements this specific (and 
Eckel and Grossman certainly never did) but to point out that such statements are 
possible, if extreme. 
  Is this a hypothesis? I would suggest that it is one only in the most trivial sense that 
it is a statement predicting what will happen in that particular event.  The statement 
effectively reflects the structure of the experiment and has no generality.  This is not a 
theory in the sense of a generalised set of explanatory statements but rather a hunch 
about a possible phenomenon (See Radder 2003). However, notice that the 
experiment used to test it is identical to the one needed to test the more general 
hypothesis. There is no difference between the experiments per se, merely in the 
statements being tested. The test of such a statement is effectively identical with the 
experiment itself while the experiment consists of the whole domain of the supposed 
hypothesis. 
 However such a minimalist statement could be highly appropriate, for 
example, in the case where one has constructed a CCE that produces a phenomenon 
which has no existence in the outside world.  This would occur because the 
phenomenon in a CCE may not exist independently of the instruments used to elicit it. 
If the causal factors controlled in the experiment are not, in fact, controlled then the 
phenomena elicited in the experiment would not occur. The phenomenon would be 
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jointly produced by the behaviour of subjects in the experiment together with the 
instruments used (Woodward 2003, Hacking 1983).   
The problem is not that one cannot form some kind of description of the 
research being carried out in such an experiment. This can obviously be done. Instead 
the problem is that such a statement would be trivial and have minimal explanatory 
power. Because of this many CCEs cannot be said to “test” any hypothesis as this 
would empty the term “test” of any meaning. However this does not mean that such 
experiments are useless, as they enable us to explore causal linkages in the world, 
even though the phenomena produced may not exist outside the laboratory. 
  This is not to say that there are no theoretical entities involved in an 
experiment. On the contrary, experiments have large amounts of theoretical 
knowledge embedded in the instruments used in the experiment. To take an example, 
the Becker- De Groot- Marschak elicitation device presupposes that the subjects are 
expected utility maximisers. Another example is the isolation of individuals in 
interactive experiments, which derives from theoretical concerns about them acting as 
autonomous agents. Furthermore, there is nothing in what has been said above to 
suggest that experimental results are not theoretically interpreted. Obviously they are, 
as Sugden (2005) has pointed out. What is denied here is that experiments are 
necessarily guided by, or are testing, some non- trivial hypothesis.  
 However, if one assumes that the instruments and behaviour jointly produce 
an effect in a particular experiment then how can we derive any general hypothesis 
from it? The answer is through the process of manipulation described above. A series 
of experiments must be carried out to isolate the phenomenon by manipulation using 
different treatments and by using different instruments to measure and elicit 
behaviour. At the end of this process the phenomenon can be seen to be independent 
of the instruments used to elicit it. When one gets to this stage then the phenomenon 
can be accepted as being real and used to generate more general hypotheses. 
 The emphasis in this section has been on the reality of the phenomenon being 
examined in an experiment. This has an important implication for the suggested 
autonomy of CCEs from theory in that it is claimed that the causal dependencies 
highlighted by an experiment are independent of the theory used to interpret its results 
(Franklin 1999). The economic theory behind (say) expected utility may change but 
the behaviour elicited by the instruments in an experiment remains the same. In other 
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words the meaning of the behaviour may be determined by current theory5 but the 
material facts behind it are not determined by this meaning. (Woodward 2003). As 
such experimental results may survive theoretical changes and remain important even 
under new theoretical paradigms. This suggests that CCEs are, given the caveats 
above, autonomous of theory. 
 
AUTONOMY AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
 
 External validity has recently become a serious topic of debate amongst 
experimentalists (see Schram 2005, Starmer 1999, Bardsley 2005, Siakantaris 2000 
and Guala 2002, 2005). Much of this debate follows on from similar concerns which 
have been circulating in psychology for many years (see Lowenstein 1999). The 
problem of external validity6 is quite simply stated. Why should an experiment taking 
place in a laboratory, often involving an abstract problem be relevant to the external 
world? How can we guarantee that there is “parallelism” between what happens in the 
laboratory and what happens in the external world? 
 Guala (2005) has provided the most in-depth answer to the question of 
external validity. In his view experimentation is an intermediate stage between theory 
and the outside world. Theories are formulated by theorists and are then tried out in 
experiments to find out which are applicable (in the sense of Binmore (1999)) when 
confronted with real people in a laboratory session. These phenomena can then be 
assessed for their applicability in the outside world. For him, the role of experiments 
is to create a “library of phenomena” which can then be tried out in the outside world 
for a good fit to the facts. Guala’s main tool for assessing applicability externally is 
the “field study” whereby experimentally verified phenomena are examined in 
uncontrolled natural settings7. Experiments therefore are “intermediaries” in the sense 
that they act as possible arguments against the applicability of theories in certain 
circumstances and create interesting phenomena which may exist in the external 
world. 
                                                 
5 Indeed it seems impossible to argue otherwise (see Radder 2003). 
6 I assume here that the so-called problem of artificiality is simply a version of the problem of external 
validity. 
7 It is unclear whether “Field Experiments” (see List 2003) are included in this definition. One would 
suspect not as these experiments still involve some controls. 
 10
 Guala’s ideas, while being useful for certain experiments, such as the theory 
testing experiments or the “domesticated” type of experiment are not useful for CCEs. 
The latter experiments, by definition, are not representative of external phenomena 
since their main aim is to disrupt “natural” systems in order to achieve control. It is 
unlikely therefore that a field study could ever be found which would confirm the 
results of a CCE. 
 In fact, CCEs may involve many causes and effects which do not have the 
same pattern as causes and effects in the external world. The aim of a CCE may be to 
identify multiple causes of an effect (by holding all but one of the causes constant) or 
even to find out why an effect doesn’t happen in the external world. The latter case 
could happen if, for example, two causes cancel each other out, leading to no change 
in the external world. An experiment in this case could isolate each cause and so 
create effects that do not happen in the external world (Woodward 2003). Such 
experiments would not only have no analogue in the external world but could be 
actively misleading if an attempt was made to find one. 
 If this is the case then how can the external validity of a CCE be established? 
It is insufficient to say that CCEs should be ruled out as legitimate experiments as it is 
obvious that they are useful for discovering causal mechanisms. To eliminate this 
type of experiment from the economist’s armoury would be to cripple one’s 
investigative ability and would also prevent large areas of causal linkage from ever 
being discovered.  It is the idea that CCEs focus on controlling causes that allows us 
to establish external validity. If a CCE is not externally valid then it must be because 
the designer of the experiment has misconstrued causal linkages in the external world. 
 Suppose that a sceptic claims that an experimental phenomenon is not 
externally valid. If the phenomenon has been replicated one would then have to ask 
the specific reason for why it is not valid. The only reasonable response (ignoring 
blanket denials of experimental validity) is that there is another cause that affects the 
phenomenon in the external world but not in the experiment or there is an additional 
cause within the experiment that does not exist in the external world. In both cases the 
response would be that, in principle, an experiment could be undertaken to control for 
that cause. If this experiment was undertaken and the cause shown not to be a problem 
then that specific objection would be overcome. Testing for external validity, 
therefore, is a matter of undertaking experiments to eliminate potential confounding 
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factors.  Starmer (1999) gives some examples of possible ways in which such claims 
can be dealt with in the experimental framework8. 
 This notion of external validity as an experimental problem rather than as a 
theory- testing problem gives us resources to tackle some of the problems set out in 
the literature. One is that highlighted by Bardsley (2005). Bardsley points out that the 
artificiality critique of experiments does hold when there are social relations in society 
that cannot be replicated within the laboratory. An example of this would be an 
experiment on tax evasion, where the subjects cannot realistically be forced into the 
role of taxpayers to the government if this is not actually happening within the 
laboratory. In essence they do not perceive themselves as being in the position of 
taxpayers and do not see the experimenter as being the government. One cannot 
therefore make a prediction about how they will act in an experiment in which they do 
not have the relevant expectations. 
 This is a general problem that ties in with Starmer’s (1999) worries about the 
“practicality” of some experiments. However it does fit in quite neatly with the focus 
on instrumentation in this paper. The problem is not artificiality as such- as Smith 
(1982) says people are answering real problems with real money. The problem is that 
the instruments available in current experiments are not technologically sophisticated 
enough to induce the relevant beliefs in experimental subjects. If such instruments did 
exist then such experiments would be possible (if not necessarily ethical). As the 
growth of neuroeconomics (see Camerer et al. 2004 for a review) shows, the growth 
of technology can push experimental economics in directions never previously 
thought possible. However, it has to be accepted that this does create a tight constraint 
on the type of experiment that can be undertaken. 
 One very general line of attack on experiments that uses the notion of external 
validity is that of Siakantaris (2000). Siakantaris based his critique of experiments on 
two supposed problems with external validity9. The first problem is how to assess 
whether a given experiment is externally valid. This can be done by a field study or 
by another experiment. Since Guala (2002) has answered the case of the field study 
(and they cannot be done for CCEs anyway), I will focus here on the additional 
experiment. According to Siakantaris, if an additional experiment is carried out and it 
                                                 
8 The argument given here is very close to Starmer’s although it is explicitly set out in terms of causal 
relations rather than in terms of theory testing. 
9 Guala (2002) has put forward a critique of Siakantaris. However the aim here is to answer 
Siakantaris’ points from an instrument- based point of view. 
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is found that the first experiment is externally valid then there is the question of 
whether the second one is also externally valid. As the second experiment will require 
a third and so on, this leads to an infinite regress. If the first experiment turns out not 
to be externally valid there may then, again, be doubt as to the external validity of the 
second experiment. If the latter is invalid then the first experiment may actually be 
valid since the validation experiment was worthless. This leads to a paradoxical 
situation of alternating answers. Even if the second experiment is valid then this needs 
to be proved which leads, again, to an infinite regress of further experiments. External 
validity therefore cannot be proved for any given experiment by experimental means. 
 From the point of view of this paper, the main problem with this argument is 
that it defines the external validity of a phenomenon as a binary property where an 
experiment is either externally valid or not. The argument given here is that the 
external validity of an experiment cannot be definitively tested but one can isolate 
various causes which may act as confounding factors in the external world. These 
causes can be tested in independent experiments.  There would never be one 
experiment to test for external validity as such. Instead there would be a series of 
experiments that would establish the reality of the phenomenon and then would 
establish whether it replicated causes existing in the external world. If one accepts that 
a phenomenon is real then the only remaining question is whether the pattern of 
causes in the experiment corresponds to the pattern of causes in the external world. 
 Siakantaris’ second criticism is of the ability of experiments to properly isolate 
a part of the external world. This is because the “holistic” nature of the external world 
is so full of interrelationality that phenomena cannot be isolated in the laboratory. 
This critique is partly claiming that the social world is so complicated that it cannot be 
replicated and is partly about the inability of certain social relationships to be 
replicated in the laboratory. The latter has been dealt with above when commenting 
on Bardsley’s paper. In the former case it can simply be said that Siakantaris’ 
characterisation of the social world is unacceptable. While it is true that some areas of 
the social world may be too complex for experimental research this cannot be the case 
in all areas since this would prevent any kind of theorising about causes. If one can 
pick out certain causes as being more important than others then these causes, 






  This paper has outlined a set of reasons for why a certain class of experiments in 
economics- known as Causal Control Experiments- can be considered to be 
autonomous both of economic theory and of the necessity of Field Studies to establish 
External Validity. Contrary to Guala (2005) therefore, CCEs are not intermediaries 
between theories and the external world. Furthermore CCE’s are not simply marginal 
cases but are an important class of experiment in that they investigate the causes of 
phenomena while not directly trying to model the external world. 
 However, should these conclusions be restricted to CCE’s? I would argue not. Most 
of the arguments made here are quite general and are not restricted to CCEs. The 
validity of running experiments in the form of CCEs is based around investigating 
causal links and the reality of phenomena in experiments. However, exactly the same 
argument applies even if one is testing a theory. Phenomena will still be real and one 
will still be investigating causes even if these causes are specified by a particular 
theory. Similarly for external validity: one may be able to use a field study to establish 
external validity but this does not mean that one cannot establish it by running further 
experiments. 
 It follows that the argument given here applies to all types of experiment and 
not just the special case of CCEs. While the arguments given for external validity or 
for theory- testing by Guala (2002) and Starmer (1999) are valid10, they should be 
seen as additional to those given above. Furthermore these theory based arguments 
are not valid for all experiments but only to special classes of experiment. 
Experiments can be justified on their own without recourse to theory- testing or 
external validation. 
The Instrument- based point of view also allows one to understand many of 
the habits which experimenters have developed within economics (and other 
experimental disciplines). One point that has been emphasised within the philosophy 
of experiment literature is the distinction between the theory that supports the 
instruments within the experiment and the phenomenon that is being tested. The two 
should not interact in a manner that will cause the results of the experiment to be 
biased (Hacking 1983). Ideally the theory supporting the instruments and the theory 
                                                 
10 Strictly Guala (2005) has moved away from a theory- testing view towards Binmore’s (1999) idea of 
testing for the applicability of theories. However, the arguments given here apply in both cases. 
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being tested should be completely separate. This has become plain with the use of the 
BDM device when testing for preference reversal. 
 Another implication of an instrument- based point of view is that repetition of 
experiments becomes an essential part of the experimental process. The main reason 
for this repetition is to establish the reality of the phenomenon via manipulation. By 
examining the phenomenon using different treatments one can establish that it is not 
just an artefact but is a genuine phenomenon. In addition one can establish that it is a 
phenomenon that is independent of the particular instrument used11 to elicit it. Not 
only does this view endorse extensive repetition to establish a phenomenon but it also 
requires the experiment to be calibrated (Franklin 1999). Calibration, in the form of 
pilot experiments, feedback questionnaires and tests before the experiment allow 
potential artefacts to be eliminated if, for example the subjects fail to understand the 
experiment or if the instructions are misleading. 
 The emphasis of the argument in this paper is on the fact that experiments are 
not simply devices for picking up observations of the world or for testing theories. 
They have their own complicated structure based around the fact that they use 
instruments to access phenomena. This allows them to be used to investigate 
phenomena autonomously of theory and of any potential field evidence. It allows the 
development of scientific, economic research programmes independent of theory and 
field studies which focus around experimental phenomena. This is a useful attribute 
and it also places emphasis on certain aspects of experimentation- such as repetition 
or calibration that are largely ignored by conventional methodology. This is not to say 
that experimentalists and methodologists have not endorsed these aspects of 
experimentation. Indeed they are an integral part of the methods used by 
experimentalists. However they have not been given an adequate justification and this 
is precisely what is done by the instrument- based viewpoint. 
    
  
                                                 
11 Indeed it is the absence of such consistency between instruments that causes preference reversal. The 
requirement of  “procedure invariance” is precisely the requirement that different measuring 
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